New video, shows a CNN Dr endorsing CBD cannibus e-liquid vapor(included in this trial vaping kit today)

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New video, shows a CNN Dr endorsing CBD cannibus e-liquid vapor(included in this trial vaping kit today)

there is no other thing besides it with which it could be compared. If two opposite [503] judgments presuppose an inadmissible condition, they both, in spite of their contradiction (which, however, is noreal contradiction), fall to the ground,because the condition fails under which alone either of the propositions was meant to be valid. If somebodywere to say that everybody has either a good or a bad smell, a third case is possible, namely, that it has no smell at all, in whichcase both contradictory propositions would be false. If I say that it is either good smelling or not good smelling (vel suaveolens vel non [410] suaveolens), in that case the two judgments are contradictory, and the former only is wrong, while its contradictory opposite, namely, that some bodies are not good smelling, comprehends those bodies also which have no smell at all. In the former opposition (per disparata) the contingent condition of the concept of a body (smell) still remained in the contradictory judgment and was not eliminated by it, so that the latter could notbe called the contradictory opposite of the former. If I say therefore that the world is either infinite in spaceor is not infinite (non est infinitus), then, if the former proposition is wrong, its contradictory opposite, that the world is not infinite, must be true. I should thus only eliminate an infinite world without affirming another, namely, the finite. But if I had said the world [504] is either infinite or finite (not-infinite), both statements may be false. For I then look upon the world, as by itself, determined in regard to its extent, and I do not only eliminate in theopposite statement the infinity, and with it, it may be, its whole independent existence, but I add adetermination to the world as a thing existing by itself, which may be false, because the world may not be a thing by itself, and therefore, with regard to extension, neither infinite nor finite. This kind of opposition I may be allowed to call dialectical, that the real contradiction, the analytical opposition. Thus then of two judgments opposed to each other dialectically both may be false, because the one does not only contradict the other, but says something more than is requisite for a contradiction. Ifwe regard the two statements that the world is infinite in extension, and that theworld is finite in extension, [411] as contradictory opposites, we hiume that theworld (the whole series of phenomena) is a thing by itself; for itremains, whether I remove the infinite or the finite regressus in the seriesof its phenomena. But if we remove this supposition, or this transcendental illusion, and deny that it is a thing by itself, then the contradictory opposition of the two statements becomes [505] purely dialectical, and as the world does not exist by itself (independently of the regressive series of my representations), it exists neither as a whole by itself infinite, nor as a whole by itself finite. It exists only in the empirical regressus in the series of phenomena, and nowhere by itself. Hence, if that series is always conditioned, it can never exist as complete, and the world is therefore not an inconditioned whole, and does not exist as such, either with infinite or finite extension. What has here been said of the first cosmological idea, namely, that of the absolute totality of extension in phenomena, applies to the others also. The series of conditions is to be found only in the regressive synthesis, .