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even that guidance in order to derive its support from pure concepts only. [615] What then in these LNKT transcendental proofs is 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 the cause DUWIHBEMH of the dialectical, but natural, illusion which connects the concepts of necessity and of the highest reality, and realises and hypostasises that which can MWMHPHGW only be an idea? What is the 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 cause that renders it inevitable to admit something as necessary in itself among existing things, and yet makes us shrink back from the existence of such a Being as from an abyss? What is to be done that reason should understand itself on RVXXR this point, and, escaping



from the wavering state of hesitatingly approving or disapproving, acquire a calm insight into the matter? It is surely extremely strange that, as soon as we suppose that something MPQIHD exists, we 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 cannot avoid the conclusion that something exists necessarily. On this 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 quite natural, though by no means, therefore, certain conclusion, rests the 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 whole cosmological argument. On the other side, I may take any concept of anything, and I find that its existence has never to be represented by me as absolutely necessary, nay, that 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 nothing prevents me, whatever may exist, from thinking its non-existence. I may, therefore, have to admit something necessary as the [496] condition of existing things in general, but I 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 need XSYDPXL not think any single thing as necessary in itself. In other words I can never complete the regressus to the [616] conditions of existence without admitting a necessary Being, but I can never begin with WYRJ



such a Being. If, therefore, I am obliged to think something necessary for all existing things, IGIVNA and at the same time am not justified in thinking of anything as in itself necessary, the conclusion is inevitable: that necessity and contingency do not concern things themselves, FVXXRV for otherwise there would be a contradiction, and that therefore neither of the two principles can be objective; but that they may possibly be subjective principles 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 of reason only, according to which, 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 on one side, we have to find for all that is given as existing, something that is necessary, and thus never to stop except when we have reached an a priori complete explanation; while on the other we must never hope for that completion, that is, never admit anything 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 empirical as unconditioned, and XLKODS thus dispense with its further derivation. In that sense both principles as purely heuristic and regulative, and affecting the formal interests of reason only, may well stand side by side. For the one tells us that we ought to philosophise XIS on nature as 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 if there was a necessary first cause for everything that exists, if only in order to introduce systematical unity into our knowledge, by always looking for such 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 an idea as an imagined highest cause. The other [617] warns us against mistaking any single determination concerning the existence of things 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 for such a highest cause, i.e. for something absolutely necessary, and bids us to keep the way always open for further derivation, and to treat it always 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 as conditioned. If, then, everything [497] that is perceived in things has to SHVIFJH be considered by us as only conditionally necessary, nothing that is .







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