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to us what kind of ground of those phenomena, and of their connection, may 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 be conceived to exist in the transcendental subject, which is empirically unknown to 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 us. This intelligible ground does not touch HXQER the empirical questions, but concerns only, as it would seem, the thought in the pure understanding; and although 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 the effects of that thought HUL and action of 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 the pure understanding may be discovered [546] in 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 the phenomena, these have nevertheless to be completely explained from their phenomenal cause, according to the laws of nature, by taking their empirical character as the 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 highest ground FHMIXEF of explanation, and phiing by the intelligible character, which is 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 the transcendental cause of the other, as entirely unknown, except so far as it is indicated by the empirical, as its sensuous sign. Let us apply this FAMDIEEA to experience. Man is one among the phenomena of the world of sense, and in so far one of the natural causes the causality of which must be subject to empirical laws. As such he must therefore have an empirical 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 character, like all other objects of nature. We perceive it through the forces and faculties which he shows in his actions and 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 effects. In the lifeless or merely animal nature we see no ground for admitting any faculty, 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 except as sensuously conditioned. Man, however, who knows all the rest of naturethrough his senses only, knows himself through mere apperception also, and this in actions and internal determinations, which 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 he cannot ascribe to the impressions of the NHYHSQ senses. Man is thus to himself partly a phenomenon, partly, however, namely with reference to certain faculties, a purely intelligible [443] object, because the actions of these faculties cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility. We [547] 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 call these faculties understanding and reason. It is the latter, in particular, which is entirely distinguished 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 from all empirically conditioned forces or faculties, because it weighs its objects according to ideas, and determines the understanding accordingly, which then makes an empirical use of its KKXK (by themselves, however pure) concepts. That our reason possesses causality, or that 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 we at least represent to ourselves sucha causality in it, is clear from the imperatives which, in all practical matters, DEDL we impose as rules on our executive powers.The ought expresses a kind of necessity and connection with causes, which we do not find elsewhere in the whole of nature. The understanding can CQSJFB know in nature only what is present, past, or future. It 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 is impossible that anything KJIPK in it ought to be different from what it is in reality, in all these relations of time. Nay, if we VTUCX only look at the course 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 WPFX WAPJMPU of nature, the ought has no meaning whatever. We cannot ask, what ought to be in nature, as little as we can ask, what qualities a circle ought 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 to possess. We can only ask what 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 happens in it, and what qualities that which happens has. This ought expresses a possible 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 305b987c477f781d17bc82b94010de41 action, the ground of which cannot be anything but a mere concept; while in every merely natural action the ground must [548] always be a phenomenon. Now it is QUAEWQ quite true that the action to which the ought applies must be possible under natural .