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centre of all nervous activity. Such observations have, no doubt, made it more intelligible, even to the commonest understanding, what metaphysicians mean when they call all secondary qualities subjective, and deny that anything can [li] be, for instance, green or sweet, anywhere but in the perceiving subject.But the idea that these physical and physiological researches have brought us one inch nearer tothe real centre of subjective perception, that any movement of matter could in any way explain the simplest sensuous perception, or that behind the membranes and nerves we should ever catch hold of what we call the soul, or the I, or the self, need only to be stated to betray its utter folly. That men like Helmholtz and Du Bois-Reymond should find Kant's metaphysical platform bestadapted for supporting their physical theories is natural enough. Buthow can any one who weighs his words say that the modern physiology of the senses has in any way supplemented or improved Kant's theory of knowledge?1 As well might we say that spectrum analysis has improved our logic, or the electric light supplemented our geometry. 'Empirical psychology,' as Kant says, 'must be entirely banished from metaphysic, and is excluded from it by its very idea.'2 Metaphysical truth is wider than physical truth, and the new discoveries of physical observers, if they are to be more than merelycontingent truths, must find their appointed place and natural refugewithin the immoveable limits traced by the metaphysician. It was an unfortunate accident that gave to what ought to have been called prophysical, the name of metaphysical science, for it is only after having mastered the principles of metaphysic that the student of nature can begin his work in the right spirit, knowing the horizon of human knowledge, and guided by principles as unchangeable as the polestar. It would be [lii] childish to make this a question of rank or precedence it is simply a question of work and order. It may require, for instance, a greater effort, and display more brilliant mental qualities, to show that nature contains no traces of repeated acts of special creation, than to prove that such a theory would make all unity of experience, and consequently all science, impossible. But what are all the negative arguments of the mere observer without the solid foundation supplied by the metaphysician? and with how much more of tranquil hiurance would the geologist pursue his observations and develop his conclusions, if he just remembered these few lines of Kant: 'When such an arising is looked upon as the effect of a foreign cause, it is called creation. This can never be admitted as an event among phenomena, because its very possibility would destroy unity of experience.'1 What can have been more delightful to the unprejudiced observer than the gradual diminution of the enormous number of what were called, bystudents of nature who had never troubled their heads about thetrue meaning of these terms, genera and species? But when the true meaning, and thereby the true origin, of genera and species was to be determined, is it not strange that not one word should ever have been said on the subjective character of these terms? Whatever else a genus or species may be, surely they are, first of all, concepts of the understanding, and, without these concepts, whatever nature might present to us, nothing would ever be to us a genus or a species. Genus and species, in that restricted sense, as applied to organic beings, represent only one side of that fundamental process on which all thought is .