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of a representation of it. In every judgment we find a concept applying to many, and comprehending [57] among the many one single representation, which is referred immediately to the object. Thusin the judgment that all bodies are divisible,1 the concept of divisible appliesto various other concepts, but is here applied in particular to the concept of body, and this concept of body to certain phenomena of our experience. [69] These objects therefore are represented mediately by the concept of divisibility. All judgments therefore are functions of unity among our representations, the knowledge of an object being brought about, not by an immediate representation, but by a higher one, comprehending this and several others, so that many possible cognitions are collected into one. As all acts of the understanding can be reduced to judgments, the understanding may be defined as the faculty of judging. For we saw before that the understanding is the faculty of thinking, and thinking is knowledge by means of concepts, while concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, refer to some representation of an object yet undetermined. Thus the concept of body means something, for instance, metal, which can be known by that concept. It is only a concept, because it comprehends other representations, by means of which it can be referred toobjects. It is therefore the predicate of a possible judgment, such as, that every metal is a body. Thus the functions of the understanding can be discovered in their completeness, if it is possible to represent the functions of unity in judgments. That this is possible will be seen in the following section. [58] Section II: Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgments [70]? If we leave out of consideration the contents of any judgment and fix our attention on the mere form of the understanding,we find that the function of thought in a judgment can be brought under four heads,each of them with I three subdivisions. They may be representedin the following table:— Quantityof Judgments Universal. Particular. II Singular. III Quality Relation Affirmative. Categorical. Negative. Hypothetical. Infinite. Disjunctive. IV Modality Problematical. hiertory. Apodictic. as this clhiification may seem to differ in some, though not very essential points, from the usual technicalities of logicians, the following reservations against any [71] possible misunderstanding will not be out of place. 1. Logicians are quite right in saying that in using judgments in syllogisms, singular judgments may be [59] treated like universal ones. For as they have no extent at all, the predicate cannot refer to part only of that which is contained in the concept of the subject, and be excluded from the rest. The predicate is valid therefore of that concept, without any exception, as if it were a general concept, having an extent to the whole of which the predicate applies. But if we compare a singular with a general judgment, looking only at the quantity of knowledge conveyed by it, the singular judgment stands to the universal judgment as unity to infinity, and is therefore essentially different from it. It is therefore, when we consider a singular judgment (judicium singulare), not only according to its own validity, but according to the quantity of knowledgewhich it conveys, as compared with other kinds of knowledge, thatwe see how different it is from general judgments (judicia communia), and how well it deserves a separate place in a complete table of the varieties of thought .