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the understanding nor of the difference of its objects. It treats of nothing but the mere form of thought. 2. As pure logic it has nothing to do with empirical principles, and borrows nothing from psychology (as some have imagined); psychology, therefore, has no influence whatever on the canon of the understanding. It proceeds by way of demonstration, and everything in it must be completely a priori. What I call applied logic (contrary to common usage according to which it contains certain exercises on the rules of pure logic) is a representation of the understanding and of the rules according to which it is necessarily [44] applied in concreto, i.e. under the accidental conditions of the subject, which may hinder or help its application, and are all given empirically only. It treats of attention, its impediments and their consequences, the sources of error, the states of doubt, hesitation, and conviction, etc., and general and pure logic stands to it in [55] the same relation as pure ethics, which treat only of the necessary moral laws of a hi will, to applied ethics, which consider these laws as under the influence of sentiments, inclinations, and phiions to which all human beings are more or less subject. Thiscan never constitute a true and demonstrated science, because, like applied logic, it dependson empirical and psychological principles. II: Of Transcendental Logic? General logic, as we saw, takes no account of the contents of knowledge, i.e. of any relation between it and its objects, and considers the logical form only in the relation of cognitions to each other, that is, it treats of the form of thought in general. But as we found, when treating of Transcendental Æsthetic, that there are pure as well as empirical intuitions, it is possible that a similar distinction might appear between pure and empirical thinking. In this case we should have a logic in which the contents of knowledge are not entirely ignored, for such a logic which should contain the rules of pure thought only, would exclude only all knowledge of a merely empiricalcharacter. It would also treat of the origin of our knowledge of objects,so far as that origin cannot be attributed [45] to the objects, while general logic is not at all [56] concerned with the origin of our knowledge, but only considers representations (whether existing originally a priori in ourselves or empirically given to us), according to the laws followed by the understanding, when thinking and treating them in their relation to each other. It is confined therefore to the form imparted by the understanding to the representations, whatever may be their origin. And here I make a remark which should never be lost sight of, as it extends its influence on all that follows. Not every kind of knowledge a priori should be called transcendental (i.e. occupied with the possibility or the use of knowledge a priori), but that only by which we know that and how certain representations (intuitional or conceptual) can be used or are possible a priori only. Neither space nor any a priori geometrical determination of it is a transcendental representation; but that knowledge only is rightly called transcendental which teaches us that these representations cannot be of empirical origin, and how they can yet refer a priori to objects of experience. The application of space to objects in general would likewise be transcendental, but, if restricted to objects of sense, it is empirical. The distinction between transcendental [57] and empirical belongs therefore to the critique of knowledge, and does not .