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| written one hundred years ago. 'Reason,'1 he writes, 'prepares the field for the understanding, '1st. Through the principle of homogeneousness of the manifold as arranged under higher genera; '2ndly. Through the principle of the variety of the homogeneous in lower species; to which, '3rdly, it adds a law of affinity of all concepts, which requires a continual transition from every species to every other species, by a gradual increase of diversity. We may call these the principles of homogeneousness, of specification, and of continuity of forms.' And with reference to the practical application of these metaphysical principles to the study of nature, he writes again with true philosophical insight:2 'I often see even intelligent men quarrelling with each other about the characteristic distinctions of men, animals, or plants, nay, even of minerals, the one admitting the existence of certain national characteristics, founded on descent, or decided and inherited differences of families, races, etc., while others insist that nature has made the same provision for all, and that all differences are due to accidental environment. But they need only consider the peculiar character of the matter, in order to understand that it is far too deeply hidden for both of them to enable them to speak from any real insight into the nature of the object. It is nothing but the twofold interest of reason, one party cherishing the one, another party the other, or pretending to do so. But this difference of the two maxims of manifoldness and unity in nature, may easily be adjusted, [lvi] though as long as they are taken for objective knowledge theycause not only disputes, but actually create impediments which hinder the progress oftruth, until a means is found of reconciling the contradictory interests, and thus giving satisfaction to reason. 'the same applies to the hiertion or denial of the famous law of the continuous scale of created beings, first advanced by Leibniz, and so cleverly trimmed up by Bonnet. It is nothing but a carrying out of the principle of affinity resting on the interest of reason, for neither observation, nor insight into the constitution of nature could ever have supplied it as an objective hiertion. the steps of such a ladder, as far as they can be supplied by experience, are far too wide apart from each other, and the so-called small differences are often in nature itself such wide gaps, that no value can be attached to such observations as revealing the intentions of nature, particularly as it must always be easy to discover certain similarities and approximations in the great variety of things. The method, on the contrary, of lookingfor order in nature, according to such a principle, and the maxim of admitting such order (though it may be uncertain where and how far) as existing in nature in general, is certainly a legitimate and excellent regulative principle of reason, only that, as such, it goes far beyond where experience or observation could follow it. It only indicates the way which leads to systematical unity, but does not determine anything beyond.' I know, of course, what some of my philosophical friends will say. 'You speak of thoughts,' they will say, 'we speak of facts. You begin with the general, we begin with the particular. You trust to reason, we trust to our [lvii] senses.' Let me quote in reply one of the most positive of positive philosophers, one who trusts to the senses, who begins with the particular, . |
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